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It was when I said, 
“There is no such thing as the truth,” 
That the grapes seemed fatter. 
The fox ran out of his hole. 
 
 Wallace Stevens begins his poem “On the Road Home” with this enigmatic 
stanza. The critical discourse surrounding Stevens is often attendant chiefly or solely to 
the philosophical implications of his poetry. In a recent book, Simon Critchley claims 
that Stevens raises epistemological questions as straw men, such that epistemology in 
general is cast aside (4). Another approach might be furnished by concentrating on the 
earthiness of the poem, which is replete with images, as the ripening grapes, of natural 
abundance. As the prolific Harold Bloom intones: “for Stevens the prime materia poetica 
is the weather” (186). Similarly, Vendler notes “…the natural cast of his eyes is upward, 
and the only phenomenon to which he is passionately attached is the weather” (47). 
Considering Stevens’ own, “poetry and materia poetica are interchangeable terms” (CPP 
901), this approach certainly has its appeal. To follow either tendency, however, would 
be superficial without first selecting a particular facet of the poem upon which to focus. 
In the above stanza, the epistemological statement and the natural phenomena following 
it are tied together by the moment of indirect discourse indicated in the first line but only 
realized in the second. The poem is composed of two kinds of events, speech acts and 
natural precipitations. In coordinating the temporal and poetic sequence of these events, 
Stevens presents the indirect discourse throughout the poem as a system—both in what is 
said (i.e. epistemology) and who says (i.e. subject-object metaphysics)—which 
undergoes disruption. What that disruption effects is release: from epistemology, unto the 
earth. In his sole book of literary criticism, The Necessary Angel, Stevens lifts a phrase 
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from one of his own poems to serve as epigraph: “. . .I am the necessary angel of earth,/ 
Since, in my sight, you see the earth again” (CPP 638).  
 The epistemological concerns bracketed in quotation marks are merely the 
contents of the discursive system. The quoted portions are more important as examples of 
communication, between the first- and second-person, than in themselves. The ‘I’ and 
‘you’ are the two poles between which the discourse takes place. The actual content of 
the discourse is disrupted only in principle: what the poem demonstrates chiefly is not a 
doubt regarding what is said but who does the saying, and what follows from the instance 
of speech, not its meaning. The pronominal forms throughout (with the possible 
exception of the third-person) step forward in speech as provisional entities: “To say that 
it [poetry] is a process of the personality of the poet does not mean that it involves the 
poet as subject” (CPP 670). Neither the ‘I’ nor the ‘you’ featured in this poem correspond 
in a one-to-one fashion to Stevens . If the first- and second-persons structuring the 
discourse belong ultimately to the same authorial unity, then their speech is neither 
subjective nor objective: the discourse is merely an example of projection. In the 
inevitable collapse of that project(ion), in the inadequacy of its epistemological claims 
and the untenability of the persons making them, the poem closes upon the possibility of 
communicating the truth of nature while opening upon the possibility of truly touching 
nature itself.  
 The poem’s title evokes a suspension both temporal and spatial: the phrases in 
transit and en route both come to mind. The title is projective. It points toward a 
provisional ‘home’ but situates the reader in the transition to, not the realization of, that 
return. Both terms, ‘provisional’ and ‘projective,’ should be understood in the context of 
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Stevens’ poetry and its critics, as ultimately doomed to failure: “There is a project for the 
sun. The sun/ Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be/ In the difficulty of what it is to 
be” (CPP 330). Stevens contradicts his own injunction, that the sun must bear no name, 
by this metaphor, “gold flourisher.” “The difficulty of what it is to be” refers to the fact 
that even in cautioning against the ultimately faulty practice of nominalization, names 
must be furnished, if only so as to be dismantled. What Vendler says of the poem from 
which this passage is taken, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” holds true for Stevens’ 
work in general: “These are programs for action, not descriptions of action; manifestos, 
not reports; potentialities, not completions” (24). As Stevens himself famously remarked 
in a letter describing that poem, "Underlying it is the idea that, in the various 
predicaments of belief, it might be possible to yield, or to try to yield, ourselves to a 
declared fiction. This is the same thing as saying that it might be possible for us to 
believe in something that we know to be untrue" (Letters 443). The poem’s discourse is 
projective in that each instance of the verb ‘to say’ indicates first a person (subject) from 
whom the saying issues forth and second implies a person (object) to whom the saying is 
directed. The discourse is provisional in the sense of not being exhaustive. The system of 
discourse (who says and what is said) succeeds in present-ing the earth only insofar as it 
collapses into the silence of the final stanza. This technique of Stevens resembles an 
Ancient Greek convention called parabasis, in which the chorus speaks on behalf of the 
poet. Importantly, as in Aristophanes, this aside is often in the voice of the first-person, 
though the entire chorus might have recited it simultaneously. Indirect discourse is to the 
poem as parabasis is to the comedy: both give voice to the author’s opinion or ideology 
yet are, ultimately, re-subsumed back into the unity of dramatic (natural) events.  
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 The poem’s first three words form the beginning of a phrasal construction that 
operates through suspension. The “That” completing the phrase does not occur until line 
three; only then do we know to what that curious “it” refers. This phrase figures a 
specific time, the ‘when,’ by first indicating it, then retracing what preceded it, the speech 
act, and only then describing its contents. The time being described is composed firstly of 
an instance of communication and secondly of natural phenomena. The reader 
experiences some difficulty, partly owed to this phrase, in deciding the sequence of those 
events. The phrase ‘it was when…that’ relates a consequence, the ‘that,’ to whatever fills 
the place of the ellipsis, the antecedent. Even an abstract or obtuse relation, as that 
between philosophizing and the ripening of fruit, presents the consequence by way of 
(graphically and syntactically) some previous event. The phenomenological experience, 
that of the reader, is one of sequence. The discourse of line two is followed (in reading 
time) by the grapes’ fattening, which in turn is followed by the fox’s exposure. Yet the 
phrase yoking all three together inscribes them within a moment—they are simultaneous. 
The two natural phenomena here are temporally instantaneous. They indicate a sudden 
transition from one visual perception to another: one instant the hole was dark, the next 
instant that hole became filled with the figure of the fleeing fox. Articulation of the 
sentence “there is no such thing as the truth” cannot, in either the time-frame of the poem 
or our reading of it, be simultaneous—that articulation as sound has duration. Both 
natural phenomena are without indication of either—they are silent, instantaneous, 
infinitesimally brief. The first line, which precedes the locution, presents it in the preterit, 
as having already happened. The third and fourth line refer to the same previous moment 
of speech but graphically follow it. The natural phenomena exist as grammatically 
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anterior (“I said” marks the “when” as before) but are experienced by the reader as 
posterior (the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ is equivalent to the ‘it’), as something 
reached only after having read the words “there is no such thing as the truth.”  
 The second stanza further complicates this temporal discord: 
 You . . . You said, 
 “There are many truths, 
 But they are not parts of a truth.” 
 Then the tree, at night, began to change 
 
The distinction between speech and phenomenon is initially clearer. The quoted portion 
has a terminal mark; the “then” following it seems, indeed, to indicate a phenomenon 
following it. This would be one form of the anaphoric ‘then,’ which “refers not to the 
same time as that of its antecedent but to a time closely following” (Huddleston, Pullum 
1559). ‘Then’ has other uses, however: “it can refer deictically to a time in the very 
recent past” (ibid). This ambiguity plunges stanza two into the same crisis of decision as 
the reader experienced in the first: is she to understand the tree’s changing as 
simultaneous with or as proceeding from the second-person’s speech? Moreover, does 
either decision imply a causal relationship between the two? These questions form the 
basis of the present inquiry. As stated, the discursive structure (of which these temporal 
concerns are but a portion) is formed around the first- and second-persons. Before such 
questions can be answered, the enigmatic ‘you’ of stanza two must be examined. 
 The ellipsis between the first and second “You” serves to rhythmically and 
conceptually separate them. That separation, as with the phrase ‘it was when…that,’ is 
both graphic and temporal, so that the reader reaches the second “You” only by moving 
through the physical space of the ellipsis and only after the hesitation indicated by those 
three dots. While the identity of the speaker might be unified (and this already assumes 
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too much), the instances of its nominalization are not, as demonstrated by this space-time 
separation, identical. On the contrary, those two instances are separated by a beat. The 
entity represented by “You” is attributed an action, speaking, only after a demurring in 
regards to the entity itself. Throughout the poem, Stevens presents the reader with first- 
and second-person pronouns that seem provisional, tentative, even dubious. In terms of 
movement, it is the “You said” that dispels that hesitation, as though the shadow of doubt 
enveloping the provisional ‘you’ were dispelled only by (its) speech.  
 Thus far the poem has grounded its indirect discourse as an exchange between the 
‘I’ and ‘you.’ The first stanza features one instance of the first-person pronoun. The 
second stanza features two instances of the second-person pronoun. As might be 
expected, the third stanza features three instances of the third-person pronoun, ‘we.’ This 
stanza draws the reader’s attention for a number of reasons. The enjambment of the 
sentence “Then the tree, at night, began to change, // Smoking through green and 
smoking blue,” carries the reader fluidly from the second to the third stanza. This 
momentum and the periods terminating each line give it a feeling of closure. Yet the third 
stanza’s brevity (it is composed of only three lines) spoils this feeling. Though the lines 
themselves entwine in rhythmic finality, the lack of a fourth amounts to a graphical 
incompletion—one which the reader is hard-pressed to ignore: 
 Smoking through green and smoking blue. 
 We were two figures in a wood. 
 We said we stood alone.   
 
The repetition of “smoking,” designating a process of transition through consumption, 
and the aforementioned enjambment place the reader, as the title suggested, in transition. 
The transition from the first- to second-person occurred formally, as the break between 
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the first and second stanzas, sans enjambment. Yet the third stanza is not a transition 
from the ‘you’ to the ‘I’ nor the reverse. Though lexically the third stanza represents a 
transition from the second- to the third-person, what it effectively produces is a conflation 
of the ‘I’ and ‘you’—it demonstrates these two entities as themselves inter-transitional. 
Because of this conflation, the third stanza features the only moment of discourse which 
is not separated from the rest of the poem by quotation marks. It is as if, in the unification 
of the poet’s two parabastic voices, the speech is no longer projective, no longer 
provisional, but enacts what it says.  
 The third-person pronoun indicates a plurality—since the only other two pronouns 
in the poem are ‘you’ and ‘I,’ it is safe to assume that plurality consists of a combination 
of the first- and second-person. Yet the tenth line complicates that conflation by means of 
a grammatical tension inherent in the construction of ‘we were two.’ The first two words 
have a unified and theoretically identical referent: ‘we,’ ‘you and I.’ That referent, as the 
word ‘pair,’ marks a unit composed of separate parts. By the imputation of two-ness, the 
third person separates back out into its constitutive difference. The image brought into 
relief, two people standing against the background of a forest, is already internally 
wrought with the grammatical bifurcation of ‘we.’ For what surfaces, by way of this 
grammatical incongruity, is the image of a single person, brought into relief by another. 
This three word phrase performs the contrapuntal operations of conjoining and 
simultaneously separating the ‘you’ and ‘I’ of the poem. 
 The grammatical tension is further emphasized by line eleven, whose construction 
is even more problematic than the previous. The contradiction or tension here centers on 
the word “alone.” The conventional use of the word indicates solitariness, as of a hermit 
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living in a wood. Etymologically, however, the word is composed of two seemingly 
contradictory terms, ‘all’ and ‘one.’ While certain disciplines, as formal logic, might be 
utilized to defend these terms as not necessarily contradictory, in common speech ‘all’ is 
used when there is a plurality of elements. ‘One,’ on the other hand, refers to a 
singularity. The word “alone” indicates a unity but has itself a twofold composition, just 
as ‘we’ does. Furthermore, the phrase ‘we stood alone’ features the contradiction of the 
third person nominative, inherently connoting plurality, with a predicate that indicates 
singularity. The description of either the first- or second-person as ‘alone’ seems 
logically tenable. Even the phrase at hand might be made so by substituting for “alone” 
something like “by ourselves,” so that the separation is solely from the rest of humanity. 
This might be an appropriate reading, were it not impeded by the indirect discourse in 
this stanza, the only instance throughout the poem of unmarked speech. The contents of 
the indirect discourse in stanzas one and two do not relate, except by the attribution of 
speaking, to the first- and second-persons which give them voice. On the contrary, the ‘I’ 
and ‘you’ are temporary projections of the author, to whom we finally attribute the 
content. In “We said we stood alone,” however, that which is said does not merely issue 
from the ‘we,’ it is a statement of that pronoun, relating its condition. Unlike the first and 
second, the third stanza contains no natural phenomenon following the indirect 
discourse—the announcement precipitates nothing. As God’s “I am that I am,” the speech 
seems tantamount to incarnation, as though the two figures were constituted by it, as 
though only in speaking did the ‘we’ constitute itself. It is as if what precipitates is the 
truth of the poetic subject—its ‘you’ and ‘I’ apposed internally just as the ‘we’ and the 
wood against which it stands are apposed externally. 
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 Unlike the first and second, the fourth and fifth stanzas defer the precipitation of 
natural phenomena: 
 It was when I said, 
 “Words are not forms of a single word. 
 In the sum of the parts, there are only the parts. 
 The world must be measured by eye”; 
 
 It was when you said, 
 “The idols have seen lots of poverty, 
 Snakes and gold and lice, 
 But not the truth”; 
 
In each, the quoted speech carries through to the end. The semicolons concluding lines 
fifteen and nineteen conjoin the stanzas, as distinct items in a list, and situate them in the 
‘time’ indicated by the last: 
 It was at that time, that the silence was largest 
 And longest, the night was roundest, 
 The fragrance of the autumn warmest, 
 Closest and strongest. 
 
As in the poem’s first half, this construction begs considerable questions in regards to the 
order of events it delineates. The semicolons stand out in their curious capacity to 
coordinate, both syntactically and chronologically, terms in sequence. Since both stanzas 
form independent and complete thoughts, one might assume the function of these 
semicolons as non-hierarchical coordination. This possibility is permissible in terms of 
grammar, but the constraints of temporality bear down heavily upon it. Once again the 
reader confronts a chronologically prior discourse that she nonetheless experiences only 
through the present reading. The precipitation of the autumn night in the final stanza is 
temporally marked by pointing to two specific moments at which something was said. 
Both of those distinct moments of discourse are gathered under a single, singular 
demonstrative pronoun, “that.” This further entrenches the reader in the difficult decision 
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of how to understand the ambiguous ‘when’—likely simultaneous with that of the first 
and second stanzas. 
 Line twenty further compounds this difficulty: “It was at that time, that the silence 
was largest.” If this is the time to which stanzas four and five refer, what compels the 
author to describe it as silent? The only indication of time throughout the poem, each 
“when,” has been expressly joined to an act of speech. However she understands the 
connection between this speech and the tumescent silence that graphically follows it, it 
cannot be as simultaneous. If we posit saying as audible and silence as the lack of 
anything audible, then these two moments—that of speaking and that of impinging 
silence—cannot coexist. Once again the reader is tempted to ignore the grammatical 
indication, that the entirety of the poem refers to events situated in one simultaneous 
time, in favor of the phenomenological experience of those events in sequence. Unless 
she reads out loud, the reader has indeed experienced the poem’s indirect discourse as a 
kind of silence residing in a phantom ear. Especially with attention rapt upon a poem, a 
reader hears its words in a manner similar to that by which a phantom limb might feel 
pressure. This Saussure deems the “sound image” of a word. In music the term 
“audiation” refers to a cognitive capacity to hear a note internally, while there is no 
external source of sound. There is a presence of sensation arising out of an absence of 
any sensible data pertaining to the organ in question. This might be one way to reconcile 
the syntactic equivalence drawn between the instant of discourse and the silence 
concluding the poem. There is no difference between the reader’s audiation of quoted 
speech and the audiation of the final stanza’s silence. Notably, the last stanza is the only 
one that features no pronominal forms. In it, the reader is released from the structure of 
 11 
discourse that hitherto formed the ground out of which the natural phenomena (just as the 
fox) sprung. Rather than the stepping forth of the ‘you’ or ‘I,’ which presents knowledge 
of but ultimately obscures the earth, the reader experiences the earth itself, the unity out 
of which those persons individuated themselves. 
 The tension between audiation and audition is but one component of the general 
synesthesia at work in the final stanza. While “synesthesia” medically refers to the 
production of sensations in one sense organ by stimulation of another, a general theory of 
poetry as operationally synesthetic is easily constructed. It is the synesthetic aspect of 
language precisely that compels Saussure to coin the aforementioned phrase, a chimera of 
two senses, sight and sound. Stevens belongs to a long tradition of American poets who 
undermine the assumption that poetry’s material existence can be ignored. For ‘this’ [my] 
poem exists as sound in the reader’s [my] inner ear; the ellipsis of  [my] line five spans 
approximately half an inch of thin, translucent paper. ‘This,’ and any, poem is always 
already a material object of every sense one could possess.  
 If the poem as a whole exhibits synesthetic qualities, the last stanza does so not 
only formally but in its content. Here “the silence” is attributed size, “the night” shape, 
and “the fragrance of the autumn” temperature. While these attributions seem 
categorically confused, in the careful words of Stevens the expressions ring true. This is 
possible because such categories depend on a conceptual separation that is never quite 
sufficient to the phenomenological experience of sensation. It would not seem strange to 
hear an actor, walking onto stage long after the curtain has fallen and the audience 
trickled out, describe the silence of the empty house as large. Nor would one balk to hear 
a hiker describe the smell of wintry pine trees as cold. The acceptability of such 
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utterances is owed to a quality of sensation that might be deemed permeability. This 
permeability, however one might seek to explain it physiologically or chemically, 
grounds the possibility of synesthesia: were sensation as distinct as the words “eyes,” 
“ears,” “tongue” etc. synesthesia would never be possible. Because LSD and other 
hallucinogens have been known to cause it, one popular understanding of synesthesia 
involves the metaphor of “crossed wires.” What most any careful exercise in reading 
poetry demonstrates, however, is that sensations are only ever separate in theory; despite 
the convention of naming them distinctly, many of us experience ‘all’ five senses 
simultaneously and at all times.  
 As mentioned, the final stanza contains no pronominal forms. The first-, second- 
and third-person have all disappeared. The stanza refers to “that time” of the discourse, 
but neither the speakers nor what was spoken seem to have much bearing on the 
sensation at hand. The rhyme beginning with “longest” and carrying through the poem’s 
final word, “strongest,” is conclusive, almost comforting. Perhaps it is this quality that 
pardons the apparent mistakes of category confusion—perhaps the sonic rightness 
attenuates the conceptual faultiness. Whatever the case, the final stanza has about it the 
feeling of release. That word carries a great deal of potentially contradictory 
connotations. ‘Release’ here denotes, firstly, the loosening of constriction—release from 
bondage or boundary. The poem’s structure hitherto has been that of indirect discourse, 
forming the poetic space into a conversation between ‘you’ and ‘I.’ The reader, at this 
point, is released from that structure; those persons have evaporated in the face of the 
warm, fragrant, autumn night. ‘Release’ also denotes a making accessible (as in 
publishing a wide release) as well as a spreading (as of a smell being released into the 
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air). In being released from the structure of indirect discourse, both poem and reader are 
released unto the fullness of the earth. We are released from the decision crisis of 
ordering the sequence of spoken and natural events. We are released from the discourse 
of truth; the silencing of speech about the earth releases us into the possibility of 
experiencing, not attempting to make knowledgeable, nature.  
 What of that discourse—what of truth? There has been no discussion as yet 
regarding the content of the passages in quotations. All that has mattered is that they were 
attributed to a speaking pronoun. What that speaking consists of is, ironically, best 
analyzed separately: 
 “There is no such thing as the truth,” 
 
 “There are many truths, 
 But they are not parts of a truth.” 
  
 “Words are not forms of a single word. 
 In the sum of the parts, there are only the parts. 
 The world must be measured by eye”; 
 
 “The idols have seen lots of poverty, 
 Snakes and gold and lice, 
 But not the truth”; 
 
The first two aphorisms, with the play between the definite and indefinite articles, 
espouse a theory of truth as plural, not unified. Incidentally, the word “wood” in line ten 
also plays the article game: living in a wood is equivalent to living in the woods—neither 
are specific. The kind of truth articulated here does not gain its veracity through 
concordance with fact, indeed: “absolute fact includes everything that the imagination 
includes. This is our intimidating thesis” (CPP 681). The juxtaposition of Stevens’ critical 
work with these aphorisms is not haphazard: in both one hears Stevens’ academic or 
philosophical voice. In the poem this voice is distanced from poetry itself by its 
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inclusion/exclusion within quotation marks; in The Necessary Angel that distance is 
presumed as the ground of literary criticism. Critchley examines the notion of the willing, 
or declared, ‘supreme fiction’ as a way to characterize Stevens’ engagement with 
epistemology. At the inception of Things Merely Are he sets forth twenty-one 
propositions, á la Stevens’ “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” designed to orient 
and guide the reader. Ranging from the banal to the banally provocative, one in particular 
riles with its violent appropriation: “Poetry is the imagination touching reality” (11). This 
maxim is lifted from Stevens’ Adagia, a collection of fragmentary thoughts, “To touch 
with the imagination in respect to reality” (CPP 909). Critchley’s transformation of this 
fragment into an independent clause, amounting to a closure, does a huge disservice. For 
Critchley’s version inscribes the touching within a subject-object metaphysics that holds 
imagination and reality apart. Yet in the Adagia and elsewhere Stevens is emphatic in his 
conviction that the debate between the two (which imbricates that between poets and 
philosophers) can reach no conclusion—nor should we desire it to (CPP 648). 
Epistemology, as expressed in these four statements, fails because it decides (Lat. to cut 
off) between imagination and reality, while Stevens is emphatic that imagination “has the 
strength of reality or none at all” (CPP 646). While these aphorisms, and The Necessary 
Angel, are interesting and likely convey a certain tract of Stevens’ thought, they 
ultimately fail for the same reason that the imperative to give the sun no name fails.  
 The third aphorism conveys Stevens’ general rejection of a platonic system 
accounting for language. For Stevens words do not relate to (i.e. the “form” of 
wordiness), they simply relate: “Nothing is itself taken alone. Things are because of 
interrelations or interactions” (CPP 903). The relation between first- and second-person 
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pronouns demonstrates this. The word “alone,” which resounded in the poem with its 
internal contradiction, is echoed here. The discursive structure of the poem, which 
separates the ‘I’ and ‘you’ before conflating them in the ‘we,’ collapses exactly because 
of that separation, which was only ever provisional, temporary. Thus the “form” of a 
word is not absolute—just as the “idea” a poem conveys is not something separate from 
the material vehicle of the book. Similarly, the phenomenological experience of reading 
the poem is not separate from the sensual experience of what it describes. To trope 
Stevens’ “A poem is a meteor” (CPP 901), if it is effective, if it succeeds in bringing once 
again to our sight the fullness of the earth, then a poem is meteorological.  
 The imperative that ‘the world must be measured by eye,’ plays on an internal 
idiomatic contradiction. When chefs or carpenters measure ‘by eye,’ this means precisely 
measurement without metric. Measurement is a technology of systematization; it fixes a 
thing’s identity, quantifies it. This phrase describes the epistemological status of all four 
aphorisms: each attempts to ground the experience of the earth in a systematic knowledge 
of it. As Andrew Mitchell, in a paper on Bataille, argues: “Once the known is possessed 
and internalized, the relation to what lies beyond the self is severed. Our relation to the 
thing is truncated in possessing knowledge of it” (Mitchell, 2). Here then, to ‘measure by 
eye’ means to place oneself in relation to the world without attempting to possess it. In 
poetic time (both that of the poem and the phenomenological experience reading it) the 
impinging of the earth follows the indirect discourse of ‘I’ and ‘you.’ Only in the silence 
which is precedent, coextensive, and consequent of speech are we afforded contact with 
the earth.  
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 Of the four, the last aphorism in the only one containing any blatant reference 
which might involve us in the realm of religion—for most monotheists the word ‘idol’ 
carries with it a great deal of theological baggage. Suffice it so say, for the present 
endeavor, that the principal valences of this word are ‘something material that represents 
(positive)’ or ‘seeks to replace (negative)’ God. For Stevens idols, just like poems, are 
only ever material, of the earth: “the great poems of heaven and hell have been written 
and the great poem of the earth remains to be written” (CPP 730). Let us not pass over 
the habitual but strange convention of imputing vision to an inanimate object—as, for 
instance, an old machine having seen its last day. Again Stevens draws attention to a 
peculiar idiomatic expression by allowing it to work against itself. Here the effect is to 
emphasize the worldliness of the idol; its poverty is not material, for we ourselves have 
heaped gold upon it. Likewise, our temples of worship, our crucifixes, have been subject 
to the same and the same types of plagues as we ourselves. If these idols have not yet 
seen the truth, it is because they always point to a truth beyond the earth. Stevens is the 
necessary angel of the earth—in his poetry the present earth is present-ed. The angel does 
not herald or point towards God; the angel releases us from that tendency by making 
what is actually present, nature, wholly and sensually accessible.  
 My project has been tacitly informed by a question coming out of Nietzsche’s The 
Gay Science, “When may we begin to ‘naturalize’ humanity in terms of a pure, newly 
discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (169). The word ‘redemption’ comes fully loaded 
with Nietzschean subtexts too great to paraphrase, let alone import entirely. The German 
word, Erlösen, from an Ancient Greek word that also relates to the English word 
‘loosen,’ denotes much more than monetary redemption, as of a gift card. It also signifies 
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what I have called release, and is used when describing Christ’s redemption of humanity. 
If Stevens is the protagonist, as it were, of The Necessary Angel, the redemption he offers 
should not be understood theologically, as salvation. Rather, it is through the poetry, 
through the stepping forth and reabsorption of ‘I’ and ‘you,’ that we are delivered from 
the epistemological structure of discourse. In the wake of that collapse we are delivered 
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